Privacy Policy
This policy describes what GPSLarp collects, why, on what legal basis, who else sees it, how long it is kept, and what you can require us to do about it. It describes the system as it is actually built, including the places where what we can do falls short of what you might expect — those are marked rather than smoothed over.
A German-language version is available at Datenschutzerklärung. Both versions describe the same processing.
01Who is responsible
The controller for the processing described here, within the meaning of Art. 4(7) GDPR, is:
- Controller
- Nepomuk Crhonek, sole proprietor, trading as GPSLarp
- Address
- Bolleystrasse 9
8006 Zürich
Switzerland - Contact, including privacy requests
- privacy@gpslarp.com
We have not appointed a Data Protection Officer. GPSLarp does not carry out large-scale systematic monitoring and does not process special categories of data as a core activity, so the conditions in Art. 37(1) GDPR are not met. Privacy requests go to the address above and are handled by the controller directly.
Two laws apply at once
The controller is established in Switzerland, and users are in Switzerland and in the European Union. Both regimes therefore apply:
- The Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection (revFADP/revDSG) applies directly, because the controller is established in Switzerland.
- The GDPR applies in addition under Art. 3(2)(a) GDPR, because the product is deliberately offered to users in the European Union.
This policy is written to the GDPR throughout, because it is the stricter of the two on nearly every point. Where Swiss law grants you an equivalent right under another name, it is not narrowed by anything here. Which authority hears a complaint depends on where you are — see section 11.
No EU representative has been appointed
Art. 27(1) GDPR requires a controller outside the Union that offers goods or services to people in the Union to designate a representative established in the Union, unless the exemption in Art. 27(2) applies — processing that is occasional, involves no large-scale special-category data, and is unlikely to result in a risk to rights and freedoms.
No such representative has been designated. Whether the Art. 27(2) exemption covers this service has not been formally determined. We state this plainly rather than leaving the section out, which is the usual way this gap is presented. Requests from data subjects in the Union are handled directly by the controller at the address above, and none of your rights depend on a representative existing.
02What we collect, and why
GPSLarp is a desktop application that changes the GPS position your paired iPhone reports. Most of what it does happens on your own computer. The list below is exhaustive for data that reaches our servers.
Account
Sign-in is required to use the product. Authentication is operated by Clerk (see section 6), which holds your email address and credentials. Our own database does not store your email address. Against your account identifier we store only the date we first saw the account.
Subscription and entitlement
If you subscribe, we store which tier you are on, where the entitlement came from, your Stripe customer and subscription identifiers, and the date your current period ends. We never see or store your card number. Payment details are entered on Stripe's own hosted checkout page and never pass through our systems.
Free-tier counters and device identifier
The free allowance is enforced per account and per device. To make the per-device half work, the app computes a one-way SHA-256 hash of characteristics of your computer and sends only that hash. It is computed entirely on your own machine, and the values that go into it — a hardware identifier and a model name — never leave it. The API rejects anything that is not a 64-character hexadecimal digest, so a raw hardware serial cannot be stored even by accident. We cannot reverse the hash to identify your hardware; we can only tell that two requests came from the same computer.
Corrected. This paragraph called that hash salted. It is not, and it could not have been: a salt would have had to be a secret held only by us and yet applied on your machine, and those two things cannot both be true. We have removed the word rather than leave a protection overstated. What does make the value hard to guess is that most of what goes into it is a random 128-bit hardware identifier rather than something guessable like an email address — but that is not a salt, and it is not anonymity. The value is pseudonymous. The same computer produces the same hash for as long as that computer exists, which is precisely what makes it useful for counting a free allowance and precisely what makes it personal data. It is treated as personal data everywhere in this policy.
Saved locations
Locations you deliberately save are stored against your account so they are available on your other installations: a name, a latitude and longitude, and a sort position. These are stored at full precision, because rounding a location you saved on purpose would break the feature. They are coordinates you chose, not places you have been.
Product analytics
Analytics is opt-in only and off until you turn it on (see section 4). When enabled, an event carries: an event identifier, the event name, your account identifier, an installation identifier, the app version, the platform and CPU architecture, and a timestamp.
No IP address is stored with analytics events. This is structural rather than a policy promise: the event record has no field for one, and the function that builds it is not given access to request headers, so an IP address could only be added by a visible change to the code.
Location analytics
Coordinates are a separate, additional opt-in and default to off. Refusing costs you no functionality. If you do enable it, the coordinates attached to an event are rounded to four decimal places — roughly 11 metres — at the moment they are received. The precise value your device computed is never written down, so it cannot later be leaked.
The server strips coordinates from any event that arrives without consent, even if the sender included them.
Session replay
Session replay records what a visitor does on the website — pointer movement, clicks, scrolling. It is opt-in only, as a separate choice from analytics, and the recorder is not even downloaded unless you have opted in. All form inputs and typed text are masked before anything leaves your browser, and the server re-checks your recorded consent and discards anything it cannot match to one.
Consent records
When you make a choice about tracking we store the choice itself, the version of this policy it was made against, and when it was made — we are required to be able to demonstrate consent. As evidence we also keep your browser's user agent and your IP address truncated to /24 (IPv4) or /48 (IPv6), never the full address.
Website access logs
Our content delivery network can record the bare fact of a request to this website: the date and time, the host and path requested, the method, the status we answered with, the referring page, your browser's user-agent string, the country the request came from, and whether our cache served it.
It records no IP address, no cookie, and no query string. That is a choice about which fields exist in the record at all, not a deletion performed afterwards — the identifying fields are never written down in the first place, so there is no moment at which they exist and no copy of them to leak. The query string is left out for a specific reason: signing in to the app can put a short-lived credential in a web address, and a log that captured addresses would capture that too.
We would use it to answer questions nothing else here can answer — whether anyone is reaching the site, which pages they arrive on, and whether something is broken. The legal basis is Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR and the balancing test is in section 3. These records are kept for 30 days and then expire automatically, which is the "Server logs" row in section 8.
This is not switched on. The capability is built and disabled, and no access log has been recorded. We are describing it before enabling it rather than after, because the list above calls itself exhaustive and we would rather that stayed true than correct it once it was not.
What is actually running today
Corrected. This paragraph used to say that the consent, session-replay and data-export endpoints return "not implemented". That has stopped being true, and it is the wrong direction for a statement like this one to be wrong in: it told you that rights described further down could not be exercised, when they can. Recording a consent decision, storing a session recording you have consented to, and requesting a copy of your data are all implemented and in service. If you would rather not depend on a button, every right in section 10 can also be exercised by writing to us — see section 11.
What is not running is analytics. Nothing in this product sends an analytics event at all — not the desktop application and not this website — so neither the product analytics nor the location analytics described above is being collected from anywhere today, quite apart from the fact that both would need your consent first. This paragraph will be corrected when that changes; we would rather over-disclose than describe collection that is switched on later without notice.
Session replay is a different case: it is running, and it collects nothing unless you have opted in — see section 4.
03Legal basis for each purpose
| Purpose | Data | Legal basis (Art. 6(1) GDPR) |
|---|---|---|
| Providing the application; authenticating you | Account identifier, first-seen date | (b) performance of a contract |
| Syncing saved locations | Location name and coordinates | (b) performance of a contract |
| Billing, subscription management, refunds | Entitlement, Stripe identifiers | (b) performance of a contract |
| Statutory retention of business records | Invoices and payment records | (c) legal obligation |
| Enforcing the free allowance; preventing abuse | Hashed device identifier, usage counters | (f) legitimate interests — see below |
| Operating and troubleshooting the website; knowing whether anyone reaches it | Request date and time, host, path, method, status, referrer, user agent, country | (f) legitimate interests — see below |
| Metering the map licence the application is billed under (done by the map software itself, not by us) | Per-launch identifier, software version and packaging, style address, opening zoom and projection, user agent, screen and window size, display scaling, graphics hardware | (f) legitimate interests — see below |
| Product analytics | Event, version, platform, install id | (a) consent |
| Location analytics | Rounded coordinates, place name | (a) consent, separately given |
| Session replay | Masked interaction recording | (a) consent, separately given |
| Demonstrating that consent was given | Consent record, truncated IP, user agent | (c) legal obligation, Art. 7(1) |
The legitimate-interests balancing tests
Three rows above rest on Art. 6(1)(f), so there are three tests, and all three are here rather than one standing in for the others.
The free allowance. Our interest is in not giving away an unlimited quantity of a paid product to a single person creating accounts in a loop. The measure chosen is the least intrusive one we could make work: a one-way hash, computed on your own machine, of a hardware identifier we never receive — one we cannot reverse and cannot use to recognise you anywhere else, because the hash is deliberately computed so that it cannot match the value any other service would derive from the same computer. It is used for counting and nothing else — never for advertising, profiling, or building a picture of you across services. You can object to this processing under Art. 21 GDPR, though we may then be unable to offer the free allowance on that device.
The access logs. Our interest is in being able to tell whether this website works and whether anyone reaches it, which nothing else described here can tell us. The measure chosen is again the least intrusive one that answers the question: a record with no IP address, no cookie and no query string in it, which therefore cannot be tied to you, to your account, or to a second visit. Set against that, the intrusion on you is close to nil — the record does not identify you and cannot be made to — while a site whose breakage nobody can detect is a real cost to the people trying to use it. You can object under Art. 21 GDPR; but because the record contains nothing that identifies you, we will usually not be able to find yours in order to remove it, and we would rather say that plainly than imply a control we cannot operate.
The map software's reports to Mapbox. Our interest is that the map is licensed, and the licence is metered by the software itself. We are billed on what it counts, and the same licence forbids us from limiting what it sends — by changing the software or by any other means.
That makes the "could we do this less intrusively" question unusually easy to answer, and the answer is no: there is no setting, no configuration and no permitted modification that sends less. The alternatives are a different map provider, which has the same arrangement, or no map. Two other legal bases were considered and neither is available. It cannot rest on performing our contract with you, because it happens before you sign in and so happens to people who never become customers. And it cannot rest on your consent, because we could not honour a refusal — consent you are not free to withdraw is not consent, and offering it would be the dishonest option here.
The balance, stated honestly, is closer than the others on this page. In your favour: no location of any kind leaves, nothing ties the report to your account, the identifier is new on every launch, and it is five requests once per launch rather than a running stream. Against: a set of details capable of singling out your machine reaches a third country before you have agreed to anything at all, and we cannot stop it. We think the balance holds, because the alternative is not "a map with less telemetry" but "no map", and because nothing in it describes where you are or what you did. You may disagree, and if you do, the honest remedy is the one below rather than a setting we could pretend to offer.
You can object under Art. 21 GDPR, and we should be straightforward about what that can achieve, because it is less than you might expect. We cannot make the software send less. The map is not a screen you choose to open — the application draws it on every launch — so the only way to prevent these reports is not to run the application. We would rather write that sentence than offer you a switch that does nothing.
04Consent, and how to withdraw it
Analytics and session replay are two independent choices. Both default to off. Nothing is pre-ticked, because a pre-ticked box is not consent.
Refusing is exactly as easy as accepting — the same prominence and the same number of clicks. Declining costs you no feature and no performance: the session recorder is never downloaded to a browser that has not opted in.
You may withdraw consent at any time, and withdrawing is as easy as giving it (Art. 7(3) GDPR). Withdrawal takes effect for the future; it does not make processing that already happened unlawful, and see section 9 for what withdrawal does and does not delete.
Consent is versioned. If we change what we collect or why, the version increases and consent given against the old text no longer authorises anything — you will be asked again rather than silently carried over.
05Services your app contacts directly
Some features work by contacting third-party services directly from your computer. Those requests do not pass through our servers, so we never see them — but your IP address and the content of the request reach the operator concerned, and you should know that before you use the feature.
| Feature | Service contacted | What it receives |
|---|---|---|
| Searching for a place by name; naming a pin you drop | Nominatim, operated by the OpenStreetMap Foundation | The text you typed, or the coordinates you clicked, plus your IP address |
| The map itself | Mapbox (map design © Mapbox, map data © OpenStreetMap contributors) | Which map tiles you are viewing — that is, roughly which part of the
world you are looking at — plus your IP address.
The map software also reports to Mapbox on its own, five times within about a second of the window opening, and it does this before you sign in. What it sends has been measured rather than assumed, and every field that measurement found is named here: two identifiers, both newly generated on every launch, the version of the software and how it was packaged, the address of the map style, the zoom level the map opens at, the map projection and which visual effects are switched on — and a set of technical details about your machine: your browser's user-agent string, your screen, window and map size, the display scaling factor, and the name and maker of your graphics hardware. It also sends how long the map took to draw and how much of it came from cache; the licence identifiers the billing is counted on; the time of each report and its position in the batch; and its own telemetry flag, which reads off while the reports are sent regardless — which is the point made in section 3, not a switch anyone here can use. It does not send your location. Not the position you choose, and not your device's real one. That was established by reading the bytes actually sent, not from a description of them. That list is kept honest by a machine, not by memory. The recording of a real launch is stored in this application's source code, and an automated check refuses any change in which the map software sends a field these paragraphs do not mention. So the list cannot quietly fall behind the software: if an update starts sending something new, this page has to name it before that update can ship. The limit of that promise, stated rather than glossed: the recording captures what the map software sends from the page itself, and an update could in principle send something from a background thread it does not watch. We are not permitted to switch this off: the licence forbids limiting what the software sends, by modifying it or by any other means. The legal basis is Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR and the balancing test is in section 3. One thing we will not claim. Because the identifier is new each launch, Mapbox is not handed anything that follows you from one session to the next. But the machine details in that same message are the kind that can single out a device on their own, so we will not tell you that your launches cannot be connected — only that we do not send anything designed to connect them. |
| Building a route between two points — walking and driving reach different servers | For a driving route, the public OSRM demonstration
server (router.project-osrm.org). For a walking
route, the OpenStreetMap routing service at
routing.openstreetmap.de. Neither is run by us, and neither
offers us or you any availability or privacy commitment |
The start and end coordinates of the route you are planning, plus your IP address — sent to whichever of the two the mode you picked uses |
| Showing which account you are signed in as — the profile picture beside your name | Whichever host stores the picture on your sign-in provider's behalf.
For an account linked to Google that is Google Cloud Storage
(storage.googleapis.com). It is not one fixed address: the
provider chooses it per account, not us |
A request for your own profile picture, plus your IP address. It is not analytics and it is not tracking: the application asks that host for one image and sends it nothing about you beyond the request for it |
Read this one twice
The map and routing requests above are the most revealing thing this application does over the network, and they are the part we have the least control over. Panning the map to the place you intend to appear to be tells the tile provider which part of the world interests you, and planning a route sends its two endpoints to one of two public routing services — neither run by us, and neither offering any availability or privacy commitment to us or to you. Which of the two depends on whether you asked for a walking or a driving route, so the mode you choose decides which company learns where you are planning to go. None of this is joined to your account by us, and none of it reaches our analytics. We are telling you because you cannot see it from the interface.
06Recipients and sub-processors
We do not sell personal data and we do not share it for advertising. The following processors act on our behalf under Art. 28 GDPR data processing agreements:
| Processor | Role | Processing location |
|---|---|---|
| Amazon Web Services | Hosting: application servers, database, file storage, content delivery, the analytics warehouse | us-east-1 (Northern Virginia, USA) |
| Clerk | Authentication and account management; holds your email address and credentials | USA |
| Stripe | Payment processing, subscription billing, the billing portal | EU and USA |
Stripe is not only our processor. For fraud prevention, regulatory compliance and its own anti-money-laundering obligations, Stripe acts as an independent controller of payment data. That processing is governed by Stripe's own privacy policy, and we cannot instruct Stripe to stop it or delete data it holds for those purposes.
If you sign in with Apple, Google or GitHub
You can create your account with an email address, or by signing in with Apple, Google or GitHub. Those three are deliberately not in the table above: they are not our processors. We do not instruct them and they do not act on our behalf. Each is an independent controller for the sign-in service it runs, under its own privacy policy.
Choosing one of them means:
- That provider learns that you are signing in to GPSLarp, and when.
- It returns to Clerk the identifiers you approve — normally your email address and the account identifier that provider issues. Apple offers to hide your real address behind a relay address; if you use that, we only ever see the relay.
- We never receive your password for that account, and we cannot read anything else in it.
The legal basis is Art. 6(1)(b) GDPR — performing the contract you asked for, namely signing you in the way you chose. It is a choice: signing up with an email address instead involves none of these three companies. All three are US companies, so section 07 applies to them as well.
We may also disclose data where we are legally required to — a binding court order or a lawful request from a competent authority.
07International transfers
Your data is stored in the United States, not in the EU or
Switzerland. Our entire infrastructure runs in the AWS
us-east-1 region in Northern Virginia. Clerk and Stripe also process
data in the United States, as do Apple, Google and GitHub if you choose one of
them to sign in with.
The United States is a third country for the purposes of Chapter V GDPR. Transfers are made on the basis of the European Commission's adequacy decision for the EU–US Data Privacy Framework where the recipient is certified under it, and otherwise on the basis of the European Commission's Standard Contractual Clauses together with the supplementary technical measures described in section 12. For transfers from Switzerland, the Swiss–US Data Privacy Framework and the Swiss addendum to the Standard Contractual Clauses apply correspondingly.
You can request a copy of the relevant transfer safeguards from privacy@gpslarp.com.
08How long we keep things
| Data | Retention | How it ends |
|---|---|---|
| Account record, saved locations, entitlement, usage counters, consent record | Until you delete your account | Deleted on request, immediately |
| Per-computer free-allowance count (the device hash and four counters) | Kept after account deletion | Not deleted on request — see section 9 for what it is and why |
| Short-lived free-run record (account identifier and device hash) | 24 hours, swept within a further 48 | Database time-to-live. Account deletion does not reach it — see section 9 |
| Analytics events, including any rounded coordinates | 90 days | Automatic expiry rule on the storage bucket. Not deleted on request — see section 9 |
| Session replay recordings | 30 days | Database time-to-live; the record deletes itself with no job to run |
| Consent record of a visitor who never signed up | Expires automatically | Time-to-live set to expire with the recording it authorises, so evidence about a non-customer is not kept indefinitely |
| Payment-processor event markers (duplicate protection) | 30 days | Database time-to-live |
| Server logs | 30 days | Automatic expiry |
| Invoices and accounting records | As required by applicable commercial and tax law, typically 10 years | Statutory obligation; these survive account deletion |
09What erasure actually deletes
This section says something most privacy policies do not, and we would rather you read it here than discover it later.
Deleting your account immediately and permanently removes everything held against your account in our operational database: the account record, saved locations, entitlement, usage counters, and your consent record.
One thing is kept, and we would rather tell you here
The free allowance is counted per computer as well as per account. The per-computer count — the one-way hash described in section 2, together with four numbers recording how many free runs of each mode that computer has used — is kept when you delete your account. The record that connected it to you sits inside your account and is deleted with it, and the timestamps that would let anyone line the two up are removed at the same moment.
We keep it because deleting it would mean the free allowance renewed every time somebody deleted an account, which would not be a free allowance at all. It is used for counting that allowance and for nothing else — not for advertising, not for profiling, and not to recognise you anywhere else.
There is an exception to the paragraph above, and it lasts about 72 hours. Each free run writes a short-lived record carrying your account identifier and that same device hash side by side, so that a run your phone refused to start can be given back to you. It expires on a timer of its own — 24 hours, swept within a further 48 — and account deletion does not reach it. So for up to about three days after you delete your account, a record connecting that account to that computer still exists. We are saying so because the paragraph above would otherwise read as absolute, and it is not.
Analytics events are not deleted on request
Analytics events are kept in a columnar archive organised by the time they arrived, with no index from a person to their rows. There is no mechanism today to find one user's events and remove them, and building one means rewriting entire storage partitions — a job that is designed but not built.
So, honestly: if you delete your account, any analytics events you previously consented to survive, and are removed only when they reach the 90-day expiry described above. They still carry your account identifier during that window. We are not able to accelerate it.
Two things limit the exposure. Analytics is off unless you switched it on, and coordinates are off unless you switched them on separately. If you never consented, there is nothing in that archive about you at all. For the same reason, a copy of your data supplied under Art. 15 states explicitly that analytics events are not included, rather than quietly leaving them out.
Session replay recordings are on the path where deletion works: they carry a 30-day self-expiry, and they can be removed on request.
Data held by Stripe as an independent controller, and account data held by Clerk, are subject to those companies' own retention rules. We will pass on a deletion request, but we cannot compel deletion of records they are legally required to keep.
10Your rights
- Art. 15 — Access
- Confirmation of whether we process data about you, a copy of it, and the information in this policy. That copy is not quite everything, and the file itself lists what it is missing — every category it cannot reach is named inside it, with the reason, rather than quietly left out. You do not have to take our word for what is in it: open it and read the list.
- Included, among the rest: the per-computer free-allowance count described in section 9. It used to be missing, which was the wrong way round — we were deleting it when you asked us to delete your account, and not showing it when you asked to see what we hold. Still missing today, and named in the file: analytics events (section 9), session recordings, and the short-lived free-run records. Write to us at the address in section 11 for any of them.
- Art. 16 — Rectification
- Correction of inaccurate data, and completion of incomplete data.
- Art. 17 — Erasure
- Deletion of your data, subject to the limits in section 9 and to records we must keep by law.
- Art. 18 — Restriction
- Processing limited to storage only, for example while a dispute about accuracy is resolved.
- Art. 20 — Portability
- The data you provided to us, in a structured, commonly used, machine-readable format — we supply JSON — and transmission to another controller where technically feasible.
- Art. 21 — Objection
- Objection, on grounds relating to your particular situation, to processing based on legitimate interests — here, the abuse-prevention counters in section 3.
- Art. 22 — Automated decisions
- We take no decision producing legal or similarly significant effects on you by automated means, and we do not profile you. Checking whether a subscription is active is a contractual condition, not a decision about you within the meaning of Art. 22.
- Art. 7(3) — Withdrawal
- Withdraw consent at any time, as easily as it was given, effective for the future.
- Art. 77 — Complaint
- Lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority — see below.
11How to exercise them
Write to privacy@gpslarp.com from the address associated with your account, or from any address if you tell us which account you mean. We respond within one month, extensible by two further months for complex requests, in which case we will tell you inside the first month. Exercising these rights is free.
We may ask for information to confirm you are the person the data is about. We ask for the minimum needed and do not require identity documents in the ordinary case; we will not use anything you send for verification for any other purpose.
Where a complaint goes
Because two regimes apply, there are two answers, and which one is yours depends on where you are:
- In the EU or EEA
- You may lodge a complaint with the supervisory authority of your habitual residence, your place of work, or the place of the alleged infringement (Art. 77 GDPR). The European Data Protection Board publishes the list of national authorities at edpb.europa.eu. You do not need to go through us first.
- In Switzerland
- The competent authority is the Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC / EDÖB), Feldeggweg 1, 3003 Bern, edoeb.admin.ch.
This is without prejudice to any other administrative or judicial remedy.
12Security
- All traffic between your device and our servers is encrypted in transit with TLS.
- Everything stored on our servers is encrypted at rest.
- Authentication tokens on your computer are kept in the operating system's own credential store — the macOS Keychain, or Windows Credential Manager — not in a file.
- We never receive or store your password; Clerk handles authentication.
- We never receive or store card details; Stripe handles payments.
- Analytics coordinates are rounded before storage and no IP address is stored beside them, so even an attacker with the archive gets an 11-metre approximation and no network identifier.
No system is perfectly secure. Where a breach is likely to result in a high risk to your rights and freedoms, we will notify you (Art. 34 GDPR) and the competent supervisory authority (Art. 33 GDPR).
13Children
GPSLarp is not directed at children and we do not knowingly process the data of anyone under 16. If you believe a child has created an account, write to privacy@gpslarp.com and we will delete it.
14Changes to this policy
We will update this document when the processing changes. The version number and effective date at the top always identify the current text.
If a change affects what we collect or why, the consent version increases. Consent you gave against an earlier version stops authorising anything, and you will be asked again — a changed policy can never silently inherit an agreement to terms you never saw. Material changes will also be announced in the application.